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Abstract
We look for a ”good” solution to the following problem: a perfectly divisible commodity
is to be allocated in each period among a set of agents each having an exogenous charac-
teristic vector and a complete, transitive, continuous and monotonic preference relation on
his consumption. On this class we analyze the implications of well-known properties such as
Pareto optimality, no-envy, strategy proofness and no-manipulation via characteristics. We
particularly find that although the Walrasian rule is always manipulable via destruction of
characteristics, manipulation can be prevented under the constrainted Walrasian rule if the
initial allocation is determined by a dictatorial rule.
Keywords: allocation problem, Pareto Optimality, manipulation via preferences, ma-
nipulation via characteristics
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Özet
Egzojen karateristiklere ve tüketim üzerine eksiksiz, geçi¸sli, sürekli ve monoton tercih-
lere sahip ajanlara sınırsız bölünebilen bir malın her period dag˘ıtılmasıprobleminin güzel
çözümlerine baktık. Bu sınıftaki problemlerin bilinen Pareto optimal, kıskanmama, strateji
dayanıklılıg˘ıve karakteristiklerle manipulasyon yapılamama gibi aksiyomların etkilerini analiz
ettik. Özel olarak buldug˘umuz sonuçta Walras kuralının her zaman manipule edilebilirken
sınırlıWalras kuralıaltındaki manipulasyon ilk allakasyonun diktatörel bir kuralla belirlen-
mesi ile engellenebilir.
Anahtar Sözcükler: allakasyon problemi, Pareto optimalite, tercihlerle manipulasyon,
karakteristiklerle manipulasyon
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1 INTRODUCTION
We look for a “good” solution to the following problem: a perfectly divisible commodity is to
be allocated in each period among a set of agents each having an exogenous "characteristic
vector" and a complete, transitive, continuous and monotonic preference relation on his
consumption in time. The (federal) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of the US
government faces this problem in each period when allocating pollution permits to the firms.
Each permit gives the bearer firm the right to a certain amount of pollution. The permits are
allocated according to firms’ characteristics. Relevant characteristics depend on the pollutant
to be allocated. In case of local and regional pollutants, a firm’s right to pollute is bounded
by the characteristics imposed by local governments which act as exogenous characteristic for
the federal government. For example very strict local limits may be imposed on polluters in
densely populated or over-polluted areas for some of the pollutants, called local pollutants,
are absorbed in the vicinity of the emission. Another example, some of the pollutants called
regional pollutants such as sulfur cannot travel further than 200-600 miles from the source of
emission. In case of global pollutants, the characteristic of firms is the past emission level1.
Permit allocation started in US in 1899 and it is currently used in the regulation of various
pollutants.2 The current rules vary and depend on the industry being regulated. Joskow et
al. (1998) explain how Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act in the US Acid Rain Program
regulates the allocation of SO2 permits among coal burning electric generating units. Briefly,
a firm’s share is decided proportionally to an estimate of its profit maximizing emission level
or in some cases its past emission level.
There are different mechanisms used in permit allocation. One of the mechanisms that
is recently used is called the "cap and trade system" in which a central authority (such as
the EPA) sets a limit (cap) on the amount of a pollutant, and allocates it to the firms. If
some of the firms want to pollute more, they can buy permits from other firms. Stavins
1Pollutants is classified by their zone of influence. While local pollutants damage is experienced near the
source of emission, the damage from regional pollutants is experienced at greater distances from the source
of emission. On the other hand, when the damage caused by a global pollutant is determined mainly by
concetrations of pollutant in the upper atmosphere.
2All industrial waste dischargers were required to have permits from the US Army Corps of Engineers by
The Refuse Act of 1899[13].
(2001) explains these transactions. One such market is in Chicago. The Illinois EPA set up
a trading program for volatile organic compounds, called the Emissions Reduction Market
System in 1997. After 2000, eight Illinois counties started trading pollution credits over a
hundred major sources of pollution in Chicago.3
There are three important features of this example. Firstly, there is a central authority
(such as the EPA), which, in each period, allocates that period’s endowment among the
agents. Secondly, the allocation is repeated in each period. Thus we are dealing with a
dynamic problem. Finally, since the (static) allocation of the central authority is dynamically
inefficient, firms trade to get an efficient outcome. We examine these features in detail.
This thesis is organized as follows. In subsection 1.1 we will give some examples and
applications of simple allocation problems. In section 2 we will review the literature on
simple allocation problems and manipulation in exchange economies. After we set up our
model in section 3, we will introduce some axioms in section 4 and check whether they
are satisfied by our mechanisms. Particularly we will describe different manipulation types
in section 4 and inquire as to prevent them. We will conclude our work in section 5.
1.1 Examples and Applications
A simple allocation problem for a society N is an |N |+1 dimensional nonnegative real vector
(c1, ..., c|N |, E) which is explained as follows. E is the endowment which is perfectly divisible
commodity is to be allocated among members of a society and each member of the society
i ∈ N is characterized by an amount ci of the commodity to be allocated. We will discuss
two different applications of the simple allocation problem.
Permit Allocation: The Environmental Protection Agency allocates an amount E of
pollution permits among firms in (a society) N (such as CO2 emission permits allocated
among energy producers). Each firm i ∈ N , depending on its location, is imposed by the
local authority an emission constraint ci on its pollution level. For more on this application,
see Kıbrıs (2003) and the literature cited therein.
Taxation: A public authority collects an amount E of tax from a society N . Each
agent i ∈ N has income ci. This is a central and very old problem in public finance. For
example, see Edgeworth (1898) and the following literature. Young (1987) proposes a class
3http://www.epa.state.il.us/air/erms/overview.html
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of “parametric solutions” to this problem.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
The bankruptcy problem is about how to allocate an estate among creditors when the estate
is not enough to satisfy all creditors. It has been studied since very old times. For example the
Babylonian Talmud discusses such cases. There are several solutions which were proposed to
solve this problem such as the proportional rule, constrained equal awards rule, constrained
equal losses rule. These have been axiomatically studied since O’Neill (1982) relates game
theoretical models to every bankruptcy problem. He compares such rules which are proposed
to different game structures. Aumann and Maschler (1985) study the Contested Garment
Consistent rule, which is proposed by Talmud for the two claimant case. To determine which
solutions are "good" these rules are controlled whether they satisfy the desirable properties
such as Pareto optimality, fairness. Examining such rules lead the characterization of the
rules which helps to compare them. A survey on axiomatic analysis of bankruptcy problems
is given by Thomson (2003).
Although there is a huge literature on static simple allocation problems, to our knowl-
edge there is only one paper on dynamic simple allocation problems. In this paper Inarra
and Skonhoft (2008) consider allocation of fishing rights in the North East Atlantic Sea
in a dynamic setting Total Allowable Catch (TAC) as a regulating scheme. Because of
overexploiting of fish stocks, in order to sustain ecological and economic considerations an
authority sets a TAC for the actual fish (cod fish) stock. Since the total demands of agents,
Norway and Russia, exceeds this TAC a simple allocation problem occurs. They consider the
characteristics as the previous year fishing levels and analyze which one of the well-known
rules, Constrained Equal Awards rule and Proportional rule, which are well-known solution
concepts of bankruptcy problems, is better for a sustainable fishing population.
Manipulation is a central topic in economics. For exchange economies, Hurwicz (1972)
shows that an agent can achieve a better outcome by misrepresenting his preferences. He
also points out that the occurrence of this manipulation is not unique to the competitive
process but is common for any reallocation scheme that achieves Pareto optimal and individ-
ually rational outcomes. Dasgupta, Hammond and Maskin (1975) change the of individual
rationality requirement to non-dictatorship. They also allow the preferences of individuals
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to be discontinuous and they obtain similar results. Zhou (1991) proves that efficient and
strategy-proof allocation rules have to be dictatorial in pure exchange economies and he
relates his work with the Gibbard (1973) and Satterhwaite (1975) in social choice theory
which proves that any voting scheme is manipulable unless it is dictatorial.
Postlewaite (1979) studies manipulation via endowments in exchange economies. He
introduces three different forms of manipulation via endowments: manipulation via with-
holding, manipulation via coalition and manipulation via destruction. He shows that two of
them cannot be prevented, but the manipulation via destruction can be avoided by using the
gamma mechanism whose outcome will equally increase the welfare of agents. Rothschild
(1981) introduces an "arbitration rule" which makes manipulation via endowments unprof-
itable. Haller (1988) illustrates that "non-trivial" Nash equilibria of the manipulation game
converges to the Walrasian equilibrium allocation as the economy is replicated.
The most related work with our model is Turhan (2009). He studies a special case of our
model where the agents’ preferences are linear. Turhan (2009) finds that the only rule that
satisfies Pareto optimality and strategy proofness in his domain is the dictatorial rule.
3 MODEL
Let N = {1, 2} be the set of agents and T = {1, 2} be the set of periods. In each period
t ∈ T a positive endowment Et ∈ R+ is allocated. Let E = (E1, E2). Each agent i ∈ N has
a characteristic value in each period t ∈ T cti ∈ R+. Let the characteristic vector of agent i be
ci = (c
t
i)t∈T and the characteristic vector at time t be c
t = (cti)i∈N . We assume that for each
t ∈ T
∑
i∈N c
t
i ≧ E
t Let c = (c11, c
2
1, c
1
2, c
2
2) be the characteristic vector. Let B denotes the
class of all (c, E). For each i ∈ N , let Ri be a complete, transitive, continuous and monotonic
preference relation defined on R2+. Let R = (Ri)i∈N . Let Pi be the strict preference
relation of Ri. We use the vector inequalities ≦, ≤, < . Let x ∨ y = (max{xti, y
t
i})i∈N t∈T
and x ∧ y = (min{xti, y
t
i})i∈N t∈T. The simplex is △ = {x| x ∈ R
2
+ and
∑j=2
j=1 xj = 1}.
The triple (R, c, E) is a dynamic simple allocation problem for each (c, E) ∈ B and
for each i ∈ N Ri is a preference relation. Let A denote the class of all dynamic simple
allocation problems. An allocation rule is a correspondence G : A ⇉ R4+ such that for
each (R, c, E) ∈ A, for each x ∈ G(R, c, E) and for each t ∈ T, we have
∑
i∈N x
t
i = E
t.
The feasible set of a dynamic simple allocation problem is X(E) = {x = (xi)i∈N | for all
4
xi ∈ R
2
+ xi ≤ E for all i ∈ N} and the Pareto optimal set is PO(R, c,E) = {x ∈ X(E)|
there exists no x′ ∈ X(E) such that x′iRixi for all i ∈ N and x
′
jPjxj for some j ∈ N}.
3.1 Static Rules
One way to solve a dynamic simple allocation problem is using rules of static problems in each
period. A static rule for a dynamic simple allocation problems is a function F : B → R4+
such that for each t ∈ T we have
∑
i∈N F
t
i (c, E) = E
t. For example, the Proportional rule
allocates the endowment proportional to the characteristics in each period: For t ∈ T and
i ∈ N PROti(c
t, Et) = (cti/
∑
i∈N c
t
i)E
t. We denote PROt(ct, Et) = (PROti(c
t, Et))i∈N and
PRO(c,E) = (PROt(ct, Et))t∈T .
Another rule is the Equal Gains rule which allocates the endowment equally in each
period, subject to no agent receiving more than his characteristic value: For period t for
each i ∈ N , EGti(c
t, Et) = min{cti, λ
t} where λt ∈ R+ satisfies
∑
i∈N min{c
t
i, λ
t} = Et and
EGt(ct, Et) = (EGti(c
t, Et))i∈N then EG(c, E) = (EGt(ct, Et))t∈T .
The Equal Losses rule equalizes the losses agents incur in each period, subject to no
agent receiving a negative share: For period t for each i ∈ N , ELti(c
t, Et) = max{0, cti − λ
t}
where λt ∈ R+ satisfies
∑
i∈N max{0, c
t
i − λ
t} = Et and ELt(ct, Et) = (ELti(c
t, Et))i∈N then
EL(c, E) = (ELt(ct, Et))t∈T .
We will define the dictatorial rule in which one of the agents is fully satisfied, that is
the share of that agent is equal to his characteristics: the agent i Dictatorial rule is
Dii(c, E) = ci for some i ∈ N.
These rules are independent of R thus almost always violate Pareto optimality.
Let’s give an example to violating Pareto optimality by using static rules in each period:
Example 1 Assume that E = (10, 10), c1 = (7, 7) and c2 = (7, 7) and the preferences
of agents are represented with the following utility functions u1(x
1
1, x
2
1) = (x
1
1)
0.2(x21)
0.8 and
u2(x
1
2, x
2
2) = (x
1
2)
0.8(x22)
0.2. Note that PRO(c,E) = EG(c, E) = EL(c,E) = (x11, x
2
1, x
1
2, x
2
2) =
(5, 5, 5, 5) which is not Pareto optimal since u1(2, 8) > u1(5, 5) and u2(8, 2) > u2(5, 5) where
(2, 8, 8, 2) ∈ X(E).
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3.2 Market Mechanisms
One way to satisfy Pareto optimality is using a market mechanism and this is at the focus
of our analysis. A static rule determines the shares of the agents in each period and this
serves as an initial allocation. After the initial allocation, agents trade their shares in the
market. An example of these markets is the Chicago exchange permit market in the USA.
After an initial allocation by EPA, firms in the state of Illinois exchange permits in the
Chicago exchange permit market.
We will define the Walrasian rule coupled with an initial allocation rule for dynamic
simple allocation problems:
Definition 1 Let F be a static rule. The Walrasian rule from F , WF : A⇉ R
4
+ is defined
as follows: for all x ∈WF (R, c, E) there exists p ∈ △ such that for all i ∈ N pxi ≦ pFi(c, E)
and for all x
′
i ∈ R
2
+ with px
′
i ≦ pFi(c, E) we have xiRix
′
i.
In Example 1, under PRO,EA and EL rule (5, 5, 5, 5) is the initial endowment for the
Walrasian rule and {(2, 8, 8, 2)} = WF (R, c, E). Note that in the second period, agent 1 gets
higher than his characteristic value, that is 8 > c21 = 7. However, in some simple allocation
problems, the agents are not allowed to exceed their characteristics. For example in the
permit allocation problem, some pollutants are local and since these pollutants are absorbed
in that region, agents are not allowed to pollute more than their local constraints. For such
cases, we will introduce two alternative Walrasian rules. In the first one agents maximize
their utilities according in a feasible set which is constrained by their own characteristics.
In the second version of the Walrasian rule, agents maximize their utilities in a feasible
set which is constrained by the characteristic vector. For the alternative Walrasian rules,
we define that the constrained feasible set is X(c, E) = {x = (xi)i∈N | for all xi ∈ R2+
xi  (ci ∧E) for all i ∈ N}.
Definition 2 Let F be a static rule. The constrained Walrasian rule from F, W cF : A⇉ R
4
+
is defined as follows: x ∈ W cF (R, c,E) if x ∈ X(c,E) there exists p ∈ △ such that and for
all i ∈ N (i) pxi ≦ pFi(c,E) and (ii) for all x
′
i ∈ R
2
+ with x
′
i ≤ ci and px
′
i ≦ pFi(c, E), we
have xiRix
′
i.
In Example 1, while F ∈ {PRO,EG,EL} the constrained Walrasian rule is W cF =
{(4, 7, 6, 3), (3, 6, 7, 4), (3, 7, 7, 3)}. None of the elements of the W cF is Pareto optimal in
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this example. However, for allocations where the agents’ shares are bounded with their
characteristics, one of the agents cannot be better off without worsening the other agent. We
will thus define constrained optimality for this X(c, E): The constrained Pareto optimal
set is CPO(R, c, E) = {x ∈ X(c,E)| there is no x′ ∈ X(c, E) such that x′iRixi for all i ∈ N
and x′jPjxj for some j ∈ N}.
For Example 1, all three allocations chosen by W cF are constrained Pareto optimal that
is {(4, 7, 6, 3), (3, 6, 7, 4), (3, 7, 7, 3)} ∈ CPO(R, c, E).
The second version of the Walrasian rule is the following:
Definition 3 Let F be a static rule. The restricted constrained Walrasian rule from F ,W rcF :
A⇉ R4+ is defined as follows: x ∈ W
rc
F (R, c, E) if x ∈ X(c, E) and there exists price p ∈ △
such that for all i ∈ N (i) pxi ≦ pFi(c, E) and (ii) for all x
′
i ∈ R
2
+ with x
′
i ∈ [E−
∑
N\{i} cj ,
ci] and px
′
i ≦ pFi(c, E) we have xiRix
′
i.
In Example 1, {(3, y, 7, 10− y), (x, 7, 10− x, 3)| y ∈ [6, 7] and x ∈ [3, 4]} = W rcF (R, c, E)
where F ∈ {PRO,EG,EL}. Although the intersection of the W rcF and the PO(R, c,E) is
empty, all of the elements ofW rcF (R, c, E) are constrained Pareto optimal that isW
rc
F (R, c,E) ⊂
CPO(R, c, E).
Observe that in Example 1W cF choose a proper subset ofW
rc
F . This is because the budget
set in W rcF is a subset of the budget set of W
c
F . (See Figure 1 and Figure 2)
The following result shows this relationship in general:
Proposition 1 For all F, constrained Walrasian rule from F, W cF , is a subset of restricted
constrained Walrasian rule from F, W rcF , that is W
c
F ⊆W
rc
F .
Proof. Let (R, c, E) ∈ A and x ∈ W cF (R, c,E) with price p ∈ △. Since x ∈ X(c, E) by
definition of W cF for all x
′
i ∈ R
2
+ where x
′
i ≤ ci with px
′
i ≦ pFi(c, E) we have xiRix
′
i. So, for
all i ∈ N for all x′′i ∈ [E −
∑
N\{i} cj , ci] with px
′′
i ≦ pFi(c,E) we have xiRix
′′
i . Therefore
x ∈W rcF (R, c, E).
Moreover if the Walrasian rule from F picks an element x of the constrained feasible set,
x will also be picked by the constrained Walrasian rule from F and the restricted constrained
Walrasian rule from F :
Proposition 2 If x ∈ WF (R, c, E) and x ∈ X(c, E) then x ∈ W
c
F (R, c,E) and x ∈
W rcF (R, c, E).
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Figure 1: The shaded area is agent 1’s budget set for W cF . The bundle x maximizes R1 in
the shaded budget set.
F1 (c,E)
c1R1
O1
.
x
Figure 2: The shaded area is agent 1’s budget set for W rcF . The bundle x maximizes R1 in
the shaded budget set.
F1 (c,E)
E-c2
R1
c1
.
O1
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Proof. Suppose that x ∈WF (R, c, E). Then there exists p ∈ △ and there exists F (c,E) such
that for all i ∈ N, pxi ≦ pFi(c, E) and for all x
′
i ∈ R
2
+ with px
′
i ≦ pFi(c, E) we have xiRix
′
i.
So, for all x”i ∈ [0, ci] with px
′′
i ≦ pFi(c,E) we have xiRix
′′
i . Therefore x ∈ W
c
F (R, c, E).
Finally, since W cF ⊆W
rc
F so x ∈W
rc
F (R, c,E).
4 RESULTS
First we will introduce some standard axioms. Then we will check which rules satisfy them.
Since we have already defined Pareto optimality and constrained Pareto optimality, we
will not define them here.
Under our assumptions, WF satisfies Pareto optimality. On the other hand we have a
negative result for the other two Walrasian rules.
Proposition 3 For all F, W cF and W
rc
F violate Pareto optimality.
Proof. Suppose E = (10, 10) and c = (10, 0, 0, 10) and consider the utility functions:
ui = (x
1
i )
0.5(x2i )
0.5 for each i ∈ N. For any F, since
∑
i∈N c
t
i = E
t for each t ∈ T we
have F (c, E) = (10, 0, 0, 10) and also W cF (R, c,E) = W
rc
F (R, c,E) = (10, 0, 0, 10). Since
u1(5, 5) > u1(10, 0) and u2(5, 5) > u2(0, 10) W cF and W
rc
F violate Pareto optimality for all F .
Since constrained Pareto optimality is a weaker notion of Pareto optimality, Walrasian
rule also satisfies this property. Since the optimality is constrained with the feasible set,
constrained Walrasian rule and restricted constrained Walrasian rule also satisfy constrained
Pareto optimality.
Proposition 4 For all F, W rcF and W
c
F satisfy constrained Pareto optimality.
Proof. Let (R, c,E) ∈ A and xrc ∈ W rcF (R, c, E) with price p ∈ △. Suppose there exists
a x˜ ∈ X(c, E) such that for all i ∈ N we have x˜iRixrci . Then by continuity, convexity and
monotonicity of the preference relation, for all i ∈ N we must have px˜i ≥ pFi(c,E) and strict
inequality for some j ∈ N. Hence,
∑
px˜i >
∑
pFi(c, E). However since x˜ ∈ X(c, E) then∑
i∈N x˜i ≦
∑
i∈N Fi(c, E). Contradiction. Therefore x
rc is a constrained Pareto optimal.
With similar reasoning above W cF also satisfy constrained Pareto optimality.
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One of the most basic property of a simple allocation problem is that an agent should at
least 0 or the remaining endowment after all other agents are fully satisfied. We relates this
property to our model: An allocation rule G satisfies respect of minimal rights for all
(R, c,E) ∈ A if x ∈ G(R, c,E) then x ∈ X(c, E).4 Since the Walrasian rule is not constrained
with the characteristics of agents, Walrasian rule violates respect of minimal rights.
Proposition 5 For all F, WF violates respect of minimal rights.
Proof. Suppose E = (10, 10) and c = (10, 0, 0, 10) and consider the utility functions:
ui = (x
1
i )
0.5(x2i )
0.5 for each i ∈ N. For any F, since
∑
i∈N c
t
i = E
t for each t ∈ T we have
F (c,E) = (10, 0, 0, 10) and also WF (R, c,E) = (5, 5, 5, 5). However the minimal right of
agent 1 is (10, 0) and the minimal right of agent 2 is (0, 10). Then WF violates respect of
minimal rights for all F.
On the other hand, the other two Walrasian rules satisfies this property:
Proposition 6 For all F, W rcF and W
c
F respect minimal rights.
Proof. Let (R, c,E) ∈ A and xrc ∈W rcF (R, c,E) with price p ∈ △. Since x
rc ∈ X(c, E), W rcF
satisfies respect of minimal rights for all F. With similar reasoning above W cF also satisfies
respect of minimal rights.
Now we will introduce some axioms on fairness: An allocation rule G satisfies no-envy
if no agent wants to change his share with any other agent, that is for all (R, c, E) ∈ A if
x ∈ G(R, c, E) is envy free then for all i, j ∈ N we have xiRixj. All of the Walrasian rule
violates this property.
Proposition 7 For all F, WF ,W
c
F and W
rc
F violate no-envy.
Proof. Let’s look at the following example. Let E = (10, 10) and c = (9, 9, 1, 1) and the
utility functions: ui = (x1i )
0.5(x2i )
0.5 for each i ∈ N. For any F, since
∑
i∈N c
t
i = E
t for each
t ∈ T we have F (c, E) = (9, 9, 1, 1) and also WF (R, c, E) = W cF (R, c, E) = W
rc
F (R, c,E) =
(9, 9, 1, 1). Since u2(9, 9) > u2(1, 1), WF ,W cF and W
rc
F violate no-envy for all F .
4The minimal right of an agent is the maximum of 0 and the remaining amount after the other agents
are fully satisfied with their claims, that is the shares of other agents are equal to their claims. For all i ∈ N,
xti ≥ max{E
t −
∑
N\{i} c
t
j , 0} for all t ∈ T. Since this should hold for all i ∈ N, x ∈ X(c,E).
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As discussed earlier, in some dynamic simple allocation problems agents are not allowed
to be allocated more than their characteristics. We introduce this constraint to the no-
envy axiom: An allocation rule G satisfies constrained no-envy if an agent does not
want to change his share with any other agents’ share which is constrained with his own
characteristics, that is for all (R, c, E) ∈ A if x ∈ G(R, c, E) is constrained envy free if for
all i, j ∈ N we have xiRi(ci ∧ xj).
Proposition 8 For F ∈ {PRO,EL}, WF ,W
c
F and W
rc
F violate constrained envy freeness.
Proof. Let E = (8, 8) and c = (7, 7, 3, 3) and for each i ∈ N the utility functions:
ui = (x
1
i )
0.5(x2i )
0.5. WPRO(R, c,E) = W
c
PRO(R, c,E) = W
rc
PRO(R, c, E) = (5.6, 5.6, 2.4, 2.4).
Since (5.6, 5.6) > (2.4, 2.4), xˆ2 = (3, 3) and xˆ2P2x2. If F = EL then WEL(R, c,E) =
W cEL(R, c, E) = W
rc
EL(R, c, E) = (6, 6, 2, 2). Since (6, 6) > (2, 2) xˆ2 = (3, 3) and xˆ2P2x2.
Therefore for F = {PRO,EL}, WF ,W cF and W
rc
F violate constrained envy freeness.
Kıbrıs (2003) introduces a property which requires that an agent can only have the right
to envy others whose characteristics are not greater than his characteristics: An allocation
rule G satisfies hierarchical no-envy for all (R, c,E) ∈ A if x ∈ G(R, c,E) and for all
i, j ∈ N, if ci ≥ cj we have xiRixj. Before showing whether WF ,W cF and W
rc
F satisfy or not
this property, we give define another axiom in which the shares of agents are ranked due to
their characteristic values. A static rule F satisfies order preservation for all (c,E) ∈ B
for all i, j ∈ N if ci ≥ cj, we have Fi(c, E) ≥ Fj(c,E). Most of the static rules such as
Proportional Rule, Equal Gains and Equal Losses satisfy order preservation.
Proposition 9 If F satisfies order preservation then WF ,W
c
F and W
rc
F satisfy hierarchical
no-envy.
Proof. Assume that cj ≦ ci for some i, j ∈ N . Without loss of generality assume that
c2 ≤ c1. So only Agent 1 has a right to envy agent 2.
WF : Assume that x ∈ WF (R, c, E) with the price vector p ∈ △. Since c2 ≤ c1 by
order preservation of F we have F2(c, E) ≦ F1(c, E). Therefore pF2(c, E) ≦ pF1(c,E). By
definition of WF we have px2 ≦ pF2(c,E). Binding these two inequalities we have px2 ≦
pF1(c, E). Again by definition of WF for all x′1 ∈ R
2
+ with px
′
1 ≦ pF1(c, E) we have x1R1x
′
1.
Therefore x1R1x2.
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W
rc
F : Suppose that x
rc ∈ WF (R, c,E) with the price p ∈ △. Since c2 ≤ c1 by order
preservation of F we have F2(c,E) ≦ F1(c,E). Therefore pF2(c, E) ≦ pF1(c, E). By definition
of W rcF we have px
rc
2 ≦ pF2(c,E). Binding these two inequalities we have px
rc
2 ≦ pF1(c, E).
Again by definition of W rcF for all x˜1 ∈ R
2
+ and x˜1 ∈ [E − c2, c1] with px˜1 ≦ pF1(c, E) we
have xrc1 R1x˜1. Moreover since x
rc
2 ∈ [E − c2, c1] or x
rc
2 ≦ E − c2 we have x
rc
1 R1x
rc
2 . Note that
if xrc2 ≦ E − c2 by monotonicity of R1 since we have x
rc
1 R1(E − c2) therefore x
rc
1 R1a for all
a ≦ E − c2.
Since with similar reasoning above, if F satisfies order preservation W cF also satisfies
Hierarchical Envy Free.
In the following table, we summarize our general findings so far:
Axioms W F W
c
F W
rc
F
Pareto Optimality  × ×
Constrained Pareto Optimality   
Respect of Minimal Rights ×  
No− envy  × ×
Hierarchical No− envy5   
4.1 Manipulation
In this subsection, we study manipulability of dynamic rules. In our setting, there can be two
types of manipulation, manipulation via preferences and manipulation via characteristics.
Manipulation via preferences or strategy-proofness is studied by Hurwicz (1972) in the ex-
change economies. Turhan (2009) looks for strategy proof allocations in dynamic bankruptcy
problems in which preferences are linear.
An allocation rule satisfies strategy-proofness if an agent cannot be better of by mis-
representing his preferences, that is for all (R, c, E) ∈ A if x ∈ G(R, c,E) and for all i ∈ N
and for all x′ ∈ G(R′, c, E) where R′ = (R′i, Rj) we have xiRix
′
i. As Hurwicz (1972) proves
that agents can be better off with misrepresenting preferences in exchange economies, we
have similar result for Walrasian rule case:
Proposition 10 For all F, WF violates strategy-proofness.
5F satisfies order preservation for hierarchical no-envy property.
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Proof. Let’s look at the following example: Let E = (10, 10) and c = (10, 0, 0, 10) and the
utility functions of agents: u1(x11, x
2
1) = (x
1
1)
0.8(x21)
0.2 and u2(x12, x
2
2) = (x
1
2)
0.2(x22)
0.8. For all F,
F (c,E) = (10, 0, 0, 10) andWF (R, c,E) = (8, 2, 2, 8). If agent 1 misrepresents his preferences
as: uˆ1(x11, x
2
1) = (x
1
1)
0.2(x21)
0.8 then WF (R˜, c, E) = (8, 8, 2, 2). So, u1(8, 8) = 8 > 5 = u1(5, 5).
Although the Walrasian rule violates strategy-proofness, manipulation via preferences
for the other Walrasian rules can be prevented by using the dictatorship rule for initial
allocation:
Proposition 11 W cF and W
rc
F satisfy strategy-proofness if and only if for every (c, E) ∈ B
there exists i ∈ N such that F (c, E) = Di(c,E).
Proof. ⇐ For all (R, c, E) ∈ A the share of agent i by the dictatorial rule is his characteristic
value, that is Dii(c, E) = ci. ThenW
c
Di(R, c, E) =W
rc
Di(R, c, E) = (ci, E−ci). This is because
ui attains maximum at ci in the X(c, E) and W cF and W
rc
F satisfy individually rationality.
Since the final allocation is independent of the agents’ preferences, agents cannot be better
off by manipulating preferences.
⇒ Assume W cF and W
rc
F satisfy strategy-proofness and suppose for every i ∈ N F = D
i.
Then there exists an (c, E) ∈ B such that F (c, E) = w. Suppose xrc ∈ W rcF (R, c,E) and
xrc ∈ ∂X(c, E). Then there exists a price p ∈ △ such that for all i ∈ N we have pxrci ≦
pwi and for all x′i ∈ [E − c−i, ci] with px
′
i ≦ px
rc
i we have x
rc
i Rix
′
i. Assume that agent j
misrepresents his preference relation such that R′ = (Ri, R
′
j). For this preference relation, we
can find a price vector p′ ∈ △ such that for each i ∈ N for all x′′i ∈ R
2
+ and x
′′
i ∈ [E− c−i, ci]
with p′x′′i ≦ p
′wi we have x˜rci Rix
′′
i such that x˜
rc
j Pjx
rc
j (look at the Figure 3). So W
rc
F violates
strategy-proofness if F = Di.
With same reasoning aboveW cF satisfy strategy-proofness if and only if for every (c, E) ∈
B there exists i ∈ N such that F (c, E) = Di(c, E).
The second type of manipulation can be via characteristics. We will show some three
types of manipulation. These manipulation types are related with the Postlewaite (1979).
In the first manipulation type, agents can make a coalition and in a fixed period exchange
their characteristic value, that is
∑
i∈N c
t
i =
∑
i∈N cˆ
t
i for all t ∈ T. An allocation rule G
satisfies no—manipulation via static coalition for all (R, c, E) ∈ A and for all S  N ,
if x ∈ G(R, c,E) then for all cˆ ∈ R4+ such that cˆ = (cˆS, cN\S) with for all t ∈ T
∑
i∈S c
t
i =∑
i∈S cˆ
t
i and for all x
′ ∈ G(R, cˆ, E) we have xiRix
′
i for each i ∈ S.
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Figure 3: Agent 2 is better off by misrepresenting his preference in a special case where
agents’ preferences are linear.
c
1
c
2
E1
E2
R2R’2
X~ x
R1
O1
O2
. F(c,E)
R1
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Proposition 12 If |N | = 2, Walrasian rule satisfies no-manipulation via static coalition.
Proof. Since the allocation by Walrasian rule is Pareto optimal agents cannot be better off
by manipulation via static coalition.
However if |N | ≥ 3 we have a negative result:
Remark 1 If |N | ≥ 3 for all F, WF violates no—manipulation via static coalition. For a
dynamic simple allocation problem (R, c,E) ∈ A assume that
∑
i∈N c
t
i = E
t for all t ∈ T.
Then for all F, Fi(c,E) = ci for all i ∈ N which implies that characteristics of the agents
have become the initial endowment. Then characteristic values are the initial endowments of
agents and summation of the characteristic values is the total amount for an exchange econ-
omy. Postlewaite (1979) proves that any mechanism for an exchange economy is manipulable
via coalition.6 Therefore for all F, WF violates no—manipulation via static coalition.
Since the allocation by constrained Walrasian rule and restricted constrained Walrasian
rules is constrained with the characteristics vector, agents can exchange their characteristics
and be better off:
Proposition 13 For all F, W cF and W
rc
F violate no—manipulation via static coalition.
Proof. Consider the following example: Suppose E = (10, 10) and c = (10, 0, 0, 10) and the
utility functions u1 = (x11)
0.5(x21)
0.5 and u2 = (x12)
0.5(x22)
0.5. Since
∑
i∈N c
t
i = E
t for all t ∈ T,
for all F we have F (c, E) = (10, 0, 0, 10). Then W rcF (R, c, E) = W
rc
F (R, c, E) = (10, 0, 0, 10).
So u1(10, 0) = u1(0, 10) = 0. Now if agents make a coalition in which the characteristic
vector is c˜ = (5, 5, 5, 5) then they will be better off since with the same reason above for
all F, F (c˜, E) = (5, 5, 5, 5) and W rcF (R, c˜, E) = W
rc
F (R, c˜, E) = (5, 5, 5, 5) that is u1(5, 5) =
u2(5, 5) = 5 > 0.
The following axiom is weaker than no—manipulation via static coalition. An allocation
rule G satisfies no—manipulation via dynamic coalition for all (R, c, E) ∈ A and for all
S  N if x ∈ G(R, c,E) then for all cˆ ∈ R4+ such that cˆ = (cˆS, cN\S) satisfies
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈S c
t
i =
6Postewaite (1979) discusses a mechanism is C-manipulable if there exists a subset (coalition) of agents in
which all agents gain by trading their initial endowment before they enter the exchange economy. Here since
claims are fixed in a time, it can be interpreted that C-manipulable is the same argument with manipulation
via static coalition.
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∑
t∈T
∑
i∈S cˆ
t
i and for all x
′ ∈ G(R, cˆ, E) we have xiRix
′
i for each i ∈ S. Since no-manipulation
via coalition is a weaker axiom of no—manipulation via static coalition we have the following
results:
Proposition 14 For all F, WF satisfies no—manipulation via dynamic coalition for |N | = 2.
Proof. For |N | = 2 the proof is similar with the proof of proposition 12.
Remark 2 For all F, WF violates this property for |N | ≥ 3. The argument is similar with
remark 1. The manipulation via static coalition in the example of remark 1 is also manipu-
lation via dynamic coalition. Therefore we have the similar result.
Proposition 15 For all F, W cF and W
rc
F violate no—manipulation via dynamic coalition.
Proof. Consider the same example with proposition 14. The manipulation via static coali-
tion in that example is also manipulation via dynamic coalition. Therefore we have the
similar result.
In the following manipulation type, since the destruction of characteristics affects the
initial allocation an agent can destroy some of his characteristic value to be better off: An
allocation rule G satisfies no—manipulation via destruction of characteristics for all
(R, c,E) ∈ A if x ∈ G(R, c, E) then for all cˆ ∈ R4+ such that for some i ∈ N and t ∈ T
cˆti ≤ c
t
i and for all x
′ ∈ G(R, cˆ, E) for all i ∈ N we have xiRixˆi.
For the exchange economies, an agent can be better off via transferring his initial endow-
ment to the other agents. This is called transfer paradox. For the Walrasian rule case we
have similar result with transfer paradox:
Proposition 16 For all F, WF violates no-manipulation via destruction of characteristics.
Proof. Suppose there exists an F such that WF satisfies no-manipulation via destruction of
characteristics. There exists (R, c,E) ∈ A such that F (c,E) = w. Suppose x ∈WF (R, c, E).
Suppose agent 1 destroys some of his characteristic value so that c˜1 = (c˜11, c
2
1) satisfies c˜
1
1 < w
1
1
then the characteristic vectors becomes c˜ = (c˜1, c2) and for (R, c˜, E) ∈ A the initial allocation
becomes F (c˜, E) = w˜ and we can find a price vector p˜ ∈ △ such that for all i ∈ N for all
x˜
′
i ∈ R
2
+ with px˜
′
i ≦ pwi we have x˜iRix˜
′
i therefore x˜ ∈ WF (R, c˜, E) and x˜1P1x1. (see Figure
4)
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Figure 4: Agent 1 is better of by destruction of his first characteristic value.
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This means that the EPA cannot prevent manipulation via destruction of characteristics
for the global pollutants.
Let’s give an example:
Example 2 (Original example is in MWG[14]). Suppose E = (2+r, 2+r) where r = 28/9−
21/9 ≃ 0.7717. Let c = (E,E, r, 2) and let the utilities of agents be u1(x
1
1, x
2
1) = x
1
1−1/8(x
2
1)
−8
and u2(x
1
2, x
2
2) = −1/8(x
1
2)
−8 + x22. Suppose F = D
2 so F (c, E) = (E − c2, c2). Then there
exists 3 Walras equilibria in which the allocations and relative prices are:
x1 ≃ u1(x1) ≃ x2 ≃ u2(x2) ≃
p = 2 1.8458, 1.0801 1.7783 0.9259, 1.6916 1.4602
p = 1 1.7717, 1 1.6467 1, 1.7717 1.6467
p = 0.5 1.6916, 0.9259 1.4602 1.0801, 1.8458 1.7783
Now, assume that agent 2 destroys 10−4 amount of his second characteristics such that
c˜22 = (r, 2− 10
−4). After initial allocation there exists also 3 Walras equilibria:
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x1 ≃ u1(x1) ≃ x2 ≃ u2(x2) ≃
p = 2.01 1.8463, 1.0807 1.7791 0.9254, 1.6910 1.4586
p = 0.9835 1.7698, 0.9982 1.6430 1.0019, 1.7735 1.6504
p = 0.506 1.6931, 0.9271 1.4641 1.0786, 1.8446 1.7764
With p = 1 his utility is u2(x2) ≃ 1.6467 and when he destroys some of his characteristics
then with p = 0.9835 his utility becomes u2(x2) ≃ 1.6504. So we can see that agent 2 can
gain by destroying some of his characteristic value even he is fully satisfied by the initial
allocation rule.
There is a large literature on manipulation. For exchange economies, Postlewaite (1979)
constructs a mechanism, γ, in order to prevent manipulation via destruction of initial endow-
ment. Since destruction of characteristics directly affects the initial allocation, we relate this
γ mechanism to our work. Let’s consider the following a dynamic simple allocation problem:
A = (R, c, E) and for all i ∈ N let Ri be represented by the continuous utility function
ui and let w = F (c,E). Since X(E) is compact and utility functions are continuous, then
there exists x¯ ∈ X(E) such that V (x) = mini∈N ui(xi) − ui(wi) achieves a maximum at x¯
and ui(x¯i)− ui(wi) = uj(x¯j)− uj(wj) for all i, j ∈ N . Since V (x) achieves a maximum at x¯
and ui(x¯i) − ui(wi) = uj(x¯j) − uj(wj) for all i, j ∈ N there is no xˆ ∈ X(E) such that both
agents will be better of with xˆ, that is a Pareto optimal allocation. Finally, since utility
functions are strictly concave, there exists unique x¯. The mechanism γF : A → X(E) such
that γF (R, c,E) = x¯.
For some dynamic simple allocation problems in which agents are not allowed to be
allocated more than characteristics. For others we define constrained mechanism is γcF : A →
X(c,E) such that γcF (R, c, E) = x¯ where x¯ ∈ X(c,E) maximizes V (x) in the constrained
feasible set X(c,E).
We show that under some conditions these mechanisms can prevent manipulation via
destruction of characteristics:
Proposition 17 Suppose F satisfies order preservation then γF and γ
c
F satisfy no manipu-
lation via destruction of characteristics.
Proof. Assume that F satisfies order preservation and suppose γF is manipulable via
destruction of characteristics. Let F (c, E) = w and γF (R, c, E) = x¯. Assume one of the
agents destroys some of his characteristics (without loss of generality agent 1) such that
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cˆ1 ≤ c1 then let F (cˆ, E) = wˆ and γF (R, cˆ, E) = xˆ and suppose u1(xˆ1) > u1(x¯1). Note by
order preservation of F we have wˆ1 ≤ w1 and since E − w1 ≤ E − wˆ1 therefore wˆ2 ≥ w2.
Then u1(xˆ1) − u1(w1) > u1(x¯1) − u1(w1) by equal gain property of γF we have u1(x¯1) −
u1(w1) = u2(x¯2)−u2(w2). Since γF satisfies Pareto optimality then xˆ, x¯ are a Pareto optimal
allocations and since u1(xˆ1) > u1(x¯1) we have u2(xˆ2) < u2(x¯2).Therefore u2(x¯2)− u2(w2) >
u2(xˆ2)−u2(w2). So, u1(xˆ1)−u1(w1) > u2(xˆ2)−u2(w2) which violates the equal gain property
of γF .
For γcF , the proof is similar with the γF .
If F violates order preservation then γF mechanism can violate manipulation via destruc-
tion of characteristics, because violation of order preservation leads an increase the level of
wealth of the agent who destroys his characteristics.
We then inquire whether these mechanisms can prevent other manipulation types:
Proposition 18 If |N | = 2, for all F γF satisfies no manipulation via dynamic coalition
and no—manipulation via static coalition.
Proof. Since γF (R, c, E) is a Pareto optimal allocation then an agent cannot gain without
worsening the other agent and since no—manipulation via static coalition is a weaker axiom
of no—manipulation via dynamic coalition.
Proposition 19 If |N | ≥ 3, for all F, γF violates manipulation via static coalition and
no—manipulation via dynamic coalition.
Proof. Suppose E = (9, 9). Let c1 = (6, 6), c2 = (0, 3) and c3 = (3, 0). The utility functions
are for all i ∈ N : ui(x1i , x
2
i ) = (x
1
i )
0.5(x2i )
0.5. Since
∑
i∈N c
t
i = E
t for all t ∈ T, for all F we have
F (c,E) = w = (6, 6, 0, 3, 3, 0). The outcome of the mechanism is γF (R, c, E) = (x1, x2, x3)
where x1 = (7, 7), x2 = (1, 1) and x3 = (1, 1). The gain is ui(wi)− ui(xi) = 1 for all i ∈ N.
Suppose S = {2, 3} and they make a coalition and exchange their characteristics such that
c˜2 = (3/2, 3/2) and c˜3 = (3/2, 3/2). Then F (c, E) = (6, 6, 3/2, 3/2, 3/2, 3/2) and the outcome
of the mechanism becomes γF (R, c,E) = (x˜1, x˜2, x˜3) where x˜1 = (6, 6), x˜2 = (3/2, 3/2) and
x˜3 = (3/2, 3/2) in which there is no gain for all i ∈ N. However, uj(x˜j) = 3/2 > 1 = uj(xj)
for j ∈ {2, 3}. Therefore γF violates manipulation via static coalition for all F. Since no—
manipulation via static coalition is a weaker axiom of no—manipulation via dynamic coalition
γF violates manipulation via dynamic coalition.
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Proposition 20 For all F γcF violates no-manipulation via static coalition and no-manipulation
via dynamic coalition.
Proof. Consider the following example: Suppose E = (10, 10) and c = (10, 0, 0, 10) and the
utility functions u1 = (x11)
0.5(x21)
0.5 and u2 = (x12)
0.5(x22)
0.5. Since
∑
i∈N c
t
i = E
t for all t ∈ T
for all F, we have F (c, E) = (10, 0, 0, 10) and the outcome of the mechanism is γcF (R, c,E) =
(10, 0, 0, 10). Now if agents make a coalition in which c˜ = (5, 5, 5, 5) then For all F with
the same reason above we have F (c˜, E) = (5, 5, 5, 5) and the outcome of the mechanism
becomes γcF (R, c˜, E) = (5, 5, 5, 5) So, u1(5, 5) = u2(5, 5) = 5 > 0 = u1(10, 0) = u2(0, 10).
Therefore γcF violate no—manipulation via static coalition for all F. Since no—manipulation
via static coalition is a weaker axiom of no—manipulation via dynamic coalition γcF violates
no—manipulation via dynamic coalition.
Since the outcomes of the γF and γ
c
F mechanisms are directly affected by utility functions,
we would have cardinality problem.7 Therefore we want to find an initial allocation rule to
prevent manipulation for constrained and restricted constrained Walrasian rules. We firstly
characterize the dictatorship rule:
Lemma 21 F is continuous8 and Fi(c, E) = ci for some i ∈ N if and only if F = D
i for
some i ∈ N.
Proof. ⇐: Trivially holds.
⇒: Assume E is fixed. For c∗ = (E,E) we have Fi(c∗, E) = ci for some i ∈ N. Without
loss of generality let i = 1 and F1(c∗, E) = c1. There exists c˜2 < c∗2 and for c˜ = (c
∗
1, c˜2) we
have F1(c˜, E) = c∗1. Otherwise if F (c, E) = (E − c˜2, c˜2) we will have disconnected path in
the range of the F which will violate the continuity of F. Now, let there exists c¯1 ∈ R2+ with
c¯1 < c
∗
1. For c¯ = (c¯1, c˜2) we have F1(c¯, E) = c¯1, otherwise if F (c˜, E) = (E − c¯2, c˜2) with the
same reason above the continuity of F will be violated. So, for all c ∈ R4+ with fixed E ∈ R
2
+
where c1 + c2 ≥ E, we have F = Di.
Now assume that c ∈ R4+ is fixed. The domain of E is [0, c1 + c2]. Let E = c1 + c2 then
F (c,E) = (c1, c2). For E˜ = (E1, c22) without loss of generality let F1(c, E˜) = c1 then for all
7A preference relation can be represented with many utility functions. Because of that, if an outcome of
a mechanism is affected by utility functions, we would have a cardinatility problem, that is the outcome will
change by using different utility functions for the same preference relation.
8F is continuous for all (c,E) ∈ B if it is continuous for all c′ ∈ R4+ while E is fixed and for all E
′ ∈ R+
while c is fixed.
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E¯ ∈ [E˜, E] we have F1(c, E¯) = c1 otherwise if there exists Eˆ ∈ [E˜, E] and F2(c, Eˆ) = c2 the
continuity of F will be violated.
We prove that we can prevent the manipulation via destruction of characteristics by using
the dictatorship rule for the initial allocation of the constrained Walrasian rule:
Theorem 1 Suppose F is continuous. W cF satisfies no manipulation via destruction of
characteristics if and only if Fi(c, E) = ci for some i ∈ N.
Proof. ⇐: By the previous lemma F = Di. Since for all (R, c, E) ∈ A there exists i ∈ N
such that F = Di, the outcome of constrained Walrasian rule is W cF (R, c, E) = D
i(c, E).
Since for all j ∈ N\{i} the outcome is not affected and the best outcome of the constrained
Walrasian rule for a dynamic simple allocation problem is Dii(c, E) for i ∈ N, W
c
F satisfies
no manipulation via destruction of characteristics.
⇒: Assume W cF satisfies no manipulation via destruction of characteristic vectors and
suppose Fi(c, E) = ci for all i ∈ N . Therefore Fi(c, E) < ci. Without loss of generality
suppose agent 1 destroys ǫ ∈ R+ amount of his characteristics such that c˜1 ∈ R2+ with
c˜1 = (c
1
1 − ǫ, c
2
1) and for c˜ = (c˜1, c2) let F (c˜, E) = F (c,E). We will have two cases about
F (c˜, E):
Case1: F 11 (c˜, E) > F
1
1 (c, E)
Let R = R¯ be such that: x ∈W cF (R¯, c, E) and x ∈ ∂X(c,E). For (R, c˜, E) we can find a
price vector p˜ ∈ ∆ such that for all i ∈ N for all x¯ ∈ X(c˜, E) with p˜x¯i ≦ p˜Fi(c˜, E) we have
x˜iR¯ix¯i and x˜ ∈ ∂X(c˜, E) where x˜1 ≥ x1. Therefore x˜ ∈ W cF (R¯, c˜, E) and since x˜1 ≥ x1 by
monotonicity of R¯, we have x˜1P¯1x1. (Look at the Figure 5).
Case2: F 11 (c˜, E) ≤ F
1
1 (c,E) and F
2
1 (c˜, E) = F
2
1 (c, E)
Let R = R¯ be such that: x ∈ W cF (R¯, c, E) and x ∈ ∂X(c, E). For (R¯, c˜, E) ∈ A we can
find a price vector p˜ ∈ ∆ such that for all i ∈ N and for all x¯ ∈ X(c˜, E) with p˜x¯i ≦ p˜Fi(c˜, E)
we have x˜iR¯ix¯i and x˜ ∈ ∂X(c˜, E) where x˜1 ≥ x1. Therefore x˜ ∈ W cF (R¯, c˜, E) and since
x˜1 ≥ x1 by monotonicity of R¯, we have x˜1P¯1x1. (Look at the figure).
Let R = R
′
be such that: x ∈W cF (R
′
, c, E) and x ∈ ∂X(c,E). For (R′, c˜, E) ∈ A we can
find a price vector p˜ ∈ ∆ such that for all i ∈ N and for all x¯ ∈ X(c˜, E) with p˜x¯i ≦ p˜Fi(c˜, E)
we have x˜iR¯ix¯i and x˜ ∈ ∂X(c˜, E) where x˜1 ≥ x1. Therefore x˜ ∈ W cF (R
′, c˜, E) and since
x˜1 ≥ x1 by monotonicity of R
′
, we have x˜1P
′
1x1. (Look at the Figure 6).
ThereforeW cF violates no manipulation via destruction of characteristic vectors if F = D
i
for some i ∈ N.
21
Figure 5: Case 1
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Figure 6: Case 2
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So in order to prevent manipulation via destruction characteristics for the local pollutant
case, EPA should use the dictatorial rule for the initial allocation.
5 CONCLUSION
We see that for global pollutants the agents can always manipulate the final allocation via
destruction of their characteristics. However, for the local pollutants the manipulation via
destruction of characteristic vectors is only prevented by allocating the endowment with
an initial rule of the dictatorial rule. Moreover, although agents can manipulate the final
allocation in the global pollutant market via preferences, in the local pollutant market the
manipulation via preferences can be prevented by using the dictatorial rule in the initial
allocation.
Inarra et. al. (2008) argues that future endowment can be a function of today’s allocation.
Either the total endowment allocated today or the way of allocation of today’s endowment
affects tomorrow. For example as in Inarra et. al. (2008), in the North East Atlantic Sea
after allocating the endowment of today, remaining fishes breed and the endowment of next
day increases. Therefore today’s endowment directly affects tomorrow. On the other hand
the initial allocation rule also affects the endowment of tomorrow. In their study, they show
that using constrained equal awards rule is better than proportional rule for tomorrow. This
is left for future research.
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